Many countries have undertaken central-bank independence reforms, but the years of implementation differ.
Introduction
Central-bank independence (CBI) has been increased in many countries since the late 1980s (Cukierman, 2008; Arnone et al., 2009) . The underlying motivation of the reforms leading up to this greater independence is a belief that they contribute to lower inflation rates by limiting the discretionary power of politicians, who have an incentive to use monetary policy for electoral gain (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Rogoff 1985) . There are, indeed, indications that CBI has been successful in this regard (Brumm, 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2008; Klomp and de Haan, 2010) . However, the year of implementation of these reforms differs between countries. What explains such differences in timing? Knowing the answer to this question is important, since it helps clarify which factors that facilitate or stall important economic reforms.
Therefore, we analyse potential determinants of how long it takes for CBI reforms to come about. We include political and economic factors -but also cultural variables, with special attention being paid to social trust, measured as the share of a population that thinks that people in general can be trusted. An increasing number of studies find that cultural factors, not least social trust, help explain economic, political and social outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano 2013; Algan and Cahuc 2013) .
In particular, we present reasons for expecting an inverse u-shaped relationship between social trust and the time it takes for CBI reform to be undertaken. The idea is that low trust entails a strong need for reform, which will induce policymakers to try to undertake it more swiftly, while high trust entails a strong ability to undertake reform, which will facilitate for policymakers to agree on it and to push it through. These two factors explain why low and high trust can be expected to be associated with relatively quick policy reform. At intermediate trust levels, however, there is neither need nor ability strong enough to speed up the reform process, making it slower.
Our empirical analysis supports such a pattern, for our full sample as well as for democracies and autocracies separately. Interestingly, for democracies, the inverse u shape is skewed, such that it is almost linear. This suggests that the predominant relationship is one of higher social trust being associated with faster CBI reform in this subsample. In addition, we find that some factors, in addition to trust, tend to speed up reforms: inflation, democracy, change to democracy, membership in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), number of CBI reforms in countries with which there is economic cooperation, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. Some other variables, on the contrary, seem to prolong the time to reform: unemployment and IMF credits.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to look at cultural, political and economic factors as potential explanations of how fast economic reforms are implemented. Alesina et al. (2006) include economic and political variables but not cultural ones; they find that reforms are more rapidly adopted after crises, when new governments take office and when strong presidents or clear legislative majorities are present. Otherwise, previous studies do not primarily look at the speed of reforms but at factors that might affect reforms coming about or the scope of reforms. For example, Heinemann and Tanz (2008) study how social trust relates to market-oriented institutional reforms, and they find evidence that it promotes such reforms in three areas: government size, the legal system and the regulation of private companies and the labour market. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) report that inflation and growth crises, as well as democracy and a divided system of government, are positively related to liberalization.
Similarly, Pitlik (2008) shows that a bad growth performance is conducive to liberalizing reforms in democracies but not in autocracies; and Giuliano et al. (2013) find a positive effect of democracy on the adoption of economic reforms. Daunfeldt et al. (2013) find that CBI reform was more probable in non-OECD countries if there had been high and variable inflation in the past and if the politicians faced a high probability of being replaced.
With this as the background, we first outline our theoretical idea of the relationship between social trust and reform speed; we then present our data and empirical methodology; after which the results, and our interpretation, are introduced.
Social trust and central-bank independence reform
The basic starting point is a situation with "too high inflation", as perceived by central political decision-makers. They then ponder how to reduce it, and if they (or their advisors) have read their Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Rogoff (1985) , they realise that the situation is the result of the institutional setting within which monetary policy has been conducted and the incentives this setting has entailed for them. The question is how a change in this setting that results in lower inflation can be achieved and, when a solution (CBI reform) has been identified, how it can be brought about in a quick manner. It is here that social trust becomes important, for explaining the speed with which CBI reform comes about.
Two relevant factors: need and ability
We propose, primarily inspired by Heinemann and Tanz (2008) and Berggren et al. (2014) , that two factors are relevant: the need and the ability to undertake reform.
The need for CBI reform is greater the lower the level of social trust. The reason is that with little trust, the underlying problem of the situation that gave rise to high inflation -which is a credibility or lack-of-trust problem -is worse. Plausibly then, inflation is also higher. A low-inflation monetary policy is not credible if people and financial actors do not trust the politicians to adhere to stated goals of keeping inflation low, and the well-known result with high inflation ensues. This makes it more important to change the institutional setting for monetary policy such that a decision-making instance that will have not face incentives to raise inflation gets more power. This implies a more independent central bank. However, if people trust others, including policymakers, plausibly because of displayed trustworthiness, the lack-of-trust problem is smaller and inflation arguably lower (albeit still possibly perceived to be too high). In that case, the need for CBI is smaller. If the need for reform is perceived to be high, then actors will also make stronger efforts to make it come about, and the more probable it is that it, indeed, also comes about fast. 1 To this one can add the idea of Funke (1993) , that if reform policies are not perceived as credible, one needs to implement them quickly, both to overcome resistance and to allow them to yield beneficial outcomes reasonably soon.
The ability to undertake CBI reform is greater the higher the level of social trust. This is because trust helps remove obstacles to reforms coming about, among other things in the following ways. First, trust makes it easier to dissemble expert information about the longterm benefits of reforms: people will be more willing to accept such information, from policymakers and the media, if the senders are perceived to be trustworthy (Boix and Posner, 1998) . Second, interest groups can block reform if they think that they can gain by opposing it (longer than other groups), but high trust reduces suspicion and enhances cooperation among groups, making the blocking of reforms less probable. 2 Third, compensation schemes are more credible in a setting with high trust, which makes it easier for those in society who think they will lose out on reforms to accept them, given compensation promises. Trust is also related to pro-social preferences, and therefore even people who think they will lose from reforms can be expected to be more willing to accept them even without compensation 1 The clearest illustrations of this logic appear after crises: then the need for reform is often abundantly clear, and reform then also tend to come about rather quickly. On the link between crises and reforms, see, e.g., Drazen and Grilli (1993) , Drazen and Easterly (2001) , Pitlik and Wirth (2003) and Campos et al. (2010) . 2 On wars of attrition interest-group blocking of reforms, see Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Fernandez and Rodrik (1991). schemes, if they believe that the reforms will result in good social consequences. This can make politicians in high-trust contexts bold in proposing reforms, as they consider the risk of electoral punishment relatively small. Fourth, initiators of CBI reforms in a country with high trust will not expect their political opponents to exploit a reform process for short-term gain to any great extent; and they will also expect bureaucrats, not least in the central bank, to behave well and follow their intentions with the reform, once it is in place. All of these factors indicate that trust increases the ability to undertake reform, and the higher the ability to undertake reform, the sooner it comes about, all else equal.
When putting these two factors, need and ability, together, we get a relationship between social trust and the time it takes for a CBI reform to come about in the form of an inverse u-shape. At low levels of social trust, the need for reform is urgent, and as decisionmakers therefore work hard to bring about reform, the time it takes is relatively short. At high levels of social trust, the ability for reform is high, and therefore the time for reform to become about is relatively short. At intermediate levels of social trust, neither need nor ability is very high, which implies a longer time before reform happens.
The way in which social trust matters
We see low or high social trust as helping but not solely causing CBI reform to come about. If low or high social trust was sufficient, it could not easily be explained why countries with similar trust levels have had similar CBI reforms at different points in time. Rather, according to our understanding, social trust affects some but not all necessary (and jointly sufficient) factors required for CBI reform to occur. This means that low or high social trust (compared to intermediate levels) makes it more likely that all necessary conditions are met, and that reform comes about, earlier rather than later, but it alone does not suffice.
Following Berggren et al. (2014) , we suggest these necessary conditions for reform implementation: that certain ideas have emerged and have been accepted (the identification by academic economists of the time inconsistency problem), that there is a perception of a problem that needs to be solved (high inflation rates, the political dependence of central banks) and that some individuals are willing to lead the initiation of a reform process. Social trust arguably affects the latter two of these conditions (by affecting the perceived need for and the ability to undertake reform), but it does not solely cause these necessary conditions to be met and it does not affect the first necessary condition. The time it takes for CBI reform to appear can therefore vary between countries, even though trust levels are quite stable over time and even though they are sometimes similar between countries.
Data
Based on data in Daunfeldt et al. (2013) , collected through a questionnaire to central banks worldwide, we know when major CBI reforms occurred. Hence, our dependent variable is the number of years from 1980 until CBI reform took place (2005 at the latest). This variable thus takes a low (high) value for countries implementing CBI reforms relatively early (late).
Our explanatory variable of main interest is social trust, the share of the population that answers "yes" to the first part of the question: "In general, do you think most people can be trusted or can't you be too careful?" Like Bjørnskov (2007), we use the average of all available observations in the World Values Survey, LatinoBarómetro, the AfroBarometer, the Asian and East Asia Barometers, and the Danish Social Capital Project; the idea is that averages reduce the risk of letting atypical data of individual years matter.
We also use a set of economic and political control variables, based on previous studies: inflation (IMF, 2011); unemployment (ILO, 2011) ; GDP per capita and the use of credits from the IMF (World Bank, 2011); political fragmentation in parliament and whether the country is a federation or not (Lundell and Karvonen, 2003) ; the number of coups (Marshall and Marshall, 2007) ; the quality of government (ICRG, 2008); a democracy dummy (Cheibub et al., 2010) ; change to democracy (in the preceding decade) (Cheibub et al., 2010) ; CBI reforms in economic cooperation (to capture peer effects), i.e., the number of countries with preceding CBI reforms in the organization of which the country is a member (of the European Union, the African Economic Community, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or the Latin American Free Trade Association) prior to reform in the own country (Daunfeldt et al., 2013) ; pre-reform CBI (Cukierman et al., 1992) ; dummy for members of the ESCB (European System of Central Banks); and three cultural variables: power distance (the extent to which inhabitants in a country accept that power is distributed unequally within a society), uncertainty avoidance (the tolerance of uncertainty found in people) and masculinity (the extent to which individuals in a country tend to endorse goals usually more popular among men) (De Jong, 2002) . These explanatory variables are measured as the average of the values for the ten-year period preceding CBI reforms (different time periods in different countries).
Several of these variables have missing values, and since there is a great risk that this introduces bias and affects the representativeness of the sample (from list-wise deletion of cases with missing observations), we have created a larger sample through multiple imputation (Graham et al., 2003) . The multiple imputation approach produces unbiased parameter estimates that reflect the uncertainty associated with missing observations and is robust to violations of assumptions in the underlying imputation model. We use five imputed datasets. The empirical analysis is performed on each of these datasets, and the estimation results for each are later combined (Rubin, 1987) .
The sample includes 149 countries observed annually over the period 1980 to 2005.
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here]
Empirical results
To analyze the time it takes for CBI reforms to be implemented, with particular focus on social trust, we perform a duration analysis (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) . As mentioned, our dependent variable is the number of years it takes from 1980 for CBI to be implemented. All countries enter the sample in 1980, the mean time until CBI reform is 21.5 years (median 23 years) and the number of countries implementing CBI reforms is 90. The data are right censored at 26 years (for the 59 countries without a CBI reform). In Fig. 1 To model the time it takes until a CBI reform is undertaken we utilise a parametric approach, since it produces more efficient estimates conditional on a correct distributional assumption. 4 In Table 2 we report the estimated Akaike and Bayesian information criteria for models based on the generalized gamma, Weibull, log-logistic, log-normal, gompertz and the exponential distributions, for both a linear and non-linear specification of our trust variable (including all other control variables in all specifications).
[ Table 2 about here]
As can be seen, based upon both information criteria, the generalized gamma distribution is preferable for all models (closely followed by the log-normal for the non-linear specification). The generalized gamma model has a density given by
where = exp ( ) and ( , ) are two shape parameters allowing for a flexible hazard rate. 5
Performing these tests upon our considered models confirm our previous conclusion that a generalized gamma model is preferable. Henceforth, our analysis is therefore reported for a model based on the generalized gamma distribution.
In Table 3 estimation results for a number of gamma distributed models are displayed with trust entering in a linear fashion.
[ Table 3 about here] All models imply a negative significant effect, at the 5 percent level, from trust on duration until reform, i.e., a higher trust level shortens the time until a CBI reform is implemented. To get a feeling for the magnitude of the estimates, we calculate marginal effects in the following way:
percentage change in the time it takes for CBI reform to come about = 100× ! ! ! − 1 (2) where is the change in the covariate ! . The estimate for the trust variable indicates that a increase in trust of 20 percentage points (e.g., from the level of France, 0.22, to that of the U.S., 0.42), all else equal, would decrease the time until reform by 8.8 percent. That is, if France had had the trust level of the U.S., all else equal, the CBI reform would have been implemented about one year earlier.
It also turns out that several of our control variables are related to the speed of reform.
For example, past inflation seems important. High historical inflation seems to create stronger 5 A nice feature of the model is that it nests a number of the other parametric models as special cases: Weibull ( = 1), exponential ( = = 1), log-normal ( = 0) and the standard gamma ( = 1). A drawback with the relatively more flexible generalized gamma distribution is that convergence is relatively slower and sometimes not possible, especially with relatively small samples. preferences for implementing reforms in order to achieve credibility for a low-inflation goal, supporting Hayo's (1998) claim that CBI is related to an historical feedback process. Other variables also appear to make reforms come about faster: democracy, change to democracy, ESBC membership, number of CBI reforms in countries with which there is economic cooperation, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity. To comment on a few of these, according to the results presented in Table 3 , democracies on average implement CBI reforms earlier than non-democracies; likewise, a change to democracy brings with it an earlier implementation. Countries that are members of the ESCB are on average faster with their reforms than non-membership countries. These results clearly illustrate that the institutional framework matters for reform speed.
In contrast, higher unemployment levels and more IMF credits appear to increase the time it takes for a CBI reform to come about, which is somewhat unexpected. A higher past unemployment rate relates to a delay in CBI reforms. According to the theory of time inconsistency, the benefit of implementing CBI reforms should be directly related to the gap between policymakers' unemployment target and the natural rate of unemployment (Cukierman, 1994) . As the natural rate of unemployment has tended to follow the actual unemployment rate (Elmeskov, 1994) , we would expect that countries with high unemployment implement CBI reforms earlier than those with lower unemployment. As for IMF credits, Maxfield (1997) suggests that CBI reforms are more likely to be implemented in high-debt developed countries, since they want to signal creditworthiness to foreign investors and IMF in order to get more funds. This would imply earlier reforms in high-debt countries. These theories are thus not supported by our results.
So far, we have modeled trust in a linear fashion, but as proposed in section 2, trust may stand in a non-linear relation to the time until reform. To investigate possible non-linear effects, we first consider adding a quadratic trust term. 6 In Table 4 , model 6, the results imply an inverse u shape, but the positive-sloping segment is insignificant, which can be taken to indicate that more trust speeds up CBI reform above a certain trust level. (In a model based on the log-normal distribution both trust terms, and the full inverse u relationship, are significant -results are available on request). However, we prefer another way of considering non-linearity: using a cubic spline.
With a restricted cubic spline, a continuous smooth function for trust is obtained: linear before the first knot, piecewise cubic polynomial between adjacent knots and linear again after the last knot. Modeling the non-linear effect of trust with a restricted cubic spline with three knots at the 10, 50 and 90 percentiles of the trust variable confirm the inverse u shape -now significant -see model 7 in Table 4 .
[ Table 4 about here]
In Fig. 2 [ Fig. 3 
about here]
In Table 4 we also run separate models for democracies and non-democracies (models 8 and 9). Since the sample sizes are reduced, models based on the relatively complex generalized gamma distribution turn out not to converge. However, results from models based on the log-normal distribution (second best for non-linear specification, according to Table 2) confirm the inverse u shape for both democracies and non-democracies.
In Fig. 4 , the predicted time until reform for the sample of democracies (based on model 8 from Table 4 , modeling trust as a restricted cubic spline) is displayed over the social trust variable, with the 95-percent confidence interval is indicated by the shaded area and with other explanatory variables at their mean. Interestingly, while the inverse u shape is obtained here as well, the negative slope dominates, i.e., for most democracies (those with a trust level a bit above 0.20), higher trust implies faster CBI reform. This finding for democracies is not surprising, as there are few such countries with sufficiently low trust to make a need for CBI reform strong.
[ Fig. 4 about here] In Fig. 5 , the corresponding marginal effects for an increase in trust of 10 percentage points are displayed, all else equal. To exemplify, these results imply that if Thailand (with a trust value of 0.54) increased its trust by 10 percentage points, it would, all else equal, be likely to implement a CBI reform about 1.5 years earlier.
[ Fig. 5 about here]
In Fig. 6 the predicted time until reform for the sample of non-democracies is displayed (based on model 9 from Table 4 , modeling trust as a restricted cubic spline) over the social trust variable, with a 95-percent confidence interval indicated by the shaded area and with other explanatory variables at their mean. Again, the inverse u shape is found.
[ Fig. 6 about here] In Fig. 7 , the corresponding marginal effects are shown for an increase in trust of 10 percentage points, all else equal, for the sample of non-democracies. These results for example imply that Tonga (with a trust level of 0.18) would be likely to implement a CBI reform almost 3 years later if its trust level increased by 10 percentage points.
[ Fig. 7 about here] Thus far, we have based our regressions on multiple imputation, which we consider preferable. In Table 4 , models 10 and 11, we also present results for the two different nonlinear trust specifications (quadratic trust and restricted cubic splines) where traditional mean imputation was used instead. Reassuringly, the results confirm the previously found inverse u shape for social trust.
We have performed some additional sensitivity tests (results are available on request).
Since social trust and its square are highly correlated (0.96), which could cause multicollinearity problems, we have used a specification including mean-centered social trust (with a correlation of 0.64) in model 6 from Table 4 . The results do not change qualitatively, and they do not seem to be affected by multicollinearity problems. The same conclusion is obtained when excluding other correlated variables, e.g., GDP per capita. An analysis of variance inflation factors (VIFs) in the linear regression specification (Table 3) furthermore confirms this conclusion: The mean VIF for a specification corresponding to Table 3 is 1.5, well below the conventional threshold level.
Finally, we have also tested to what extent our results are affected by extreme observations by re-estimating models on a sample excluding the top and bottom 5 percentiles of the social trust distribution. The results remain unchanged.
Concluding remarks
We bring two novelties to the CBI literature: the study of what determines the how long it takes for CBI reforms to be implemented and the use of a cultural variable, social trust, as an explanatory factor. We found that social trust matters for bringing about CBI, by affecting both the ability and the perceived need to undertake reforms. In our case, this implies an inverse u-shaped relationship, such that low and high trust levels are associated with earlier reforms. In the former case, the need for reform is sufficiently high to bring about political action and quick reform; in the latter case, the ability to undertake reform, by mitigation o various obstacles, is sufficiently high to bring about fast reform. In the intermediate case,
neither need nor ability is strong enough for trust to speed up reform, and the time it takes is consequently longer. While the inverse u shape is found for both democracies and autocracies when studying them separately, the shape of the curve for democracies is such that trust predominantly has a clear effect of speeding CBI reforms up there. In all, we suggest that social trust is of potential relevance for understanding the timing of other economic reforms as well.
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